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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARJORIE J. DURAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION,
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR 0.
STEWART and GRANT HINCHCLIFF,

Case No. 19022

Defendants-Respondents.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Marjorie J. Durand
arising out of a shoot out on the 21st day of February, 1979,
in a trailer court in the north part of Cedar City, Iron County,
State of Utah.

Mrs. Durand was an occupant of a trailer in the

court.
One Neil Anderson, together with his brother, operated
a motor vehicle repair shop on the north edge of Cedar City.
Neil Anderson lived in the same trailer court as Mrs. Durand,
only a few doors from Mrs. Durand?s trailer.

Exhibits M D M and

fl

E" attached hereto give a relative location of these two

trailers in the trailer court, although they are not drawn to
scale.
Neil Anderson and his brother had a local reputation of
indulging in alcohol in the later part of the day.

On this

particular evening, they became quite drunk and started up town.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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They were picked up by police of Cedar City and taken to the police
station.

The brother of Neil Anderson was driving.

While in all

probability that had had drink for drink, the officers called
Neil Anderson's wife to come and get him; the officers then
processed the brother for driving while under the influence of
alcohol.

Mrs. Anderson took her husband home although he had a

reputation of shooting it out with police officers, threatening
police officers, and items of this nature.

When he became

belligerent and started back to town, making threats to go back
to town to get his brother, Mrs. Anderson called the police.

The

police responded; the shoot out occurred; and as part of the shoot
out, Mrs. Durand was injured.
Mrs. Durand signed a notice and the same was served upon
Cedar City Corporation as a notice of claim within the statutory
period.

A complaint was filed, and a motion was made for the court

to set a bond for bringing an action against officers of a city.
In the due course of events, an order was filed requiring a $300.00
bond.

The bond was posted in cash as a $600.00 property bond.
In the due course of events, the defendants filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment, which was overruled and denied, on
the 7th day of May, 1982, by the District Court of Iron County.
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.

This reserved to the defendants

the right to renew the motion at the time of pretrial.
time of the pretrial, the motion was renewed.

At the

Without additional

evidence or without additional affidavits, the court ruled
that the summary judgment should be granted.
only item that the court decided.

This is the

No other question was decided
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by the court at that time; Exhibit "B", "Summary Judgment,"
dated the 1st day of February, 1983, is the result thereof.

There

is as part of the record on appeal, a short court proceeding of
the 7th day of January, 1983, in which the argument was submitted.
The court specifically refused to rule on any other point.

See

transcript of January 7, 1983, page 4, line 17-19, inclusive.
This appeal is based on that specific ruling, and is an appeal
from the order graning the motion for summary judgment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On January 7, 1983, the trial court saw fit to grant
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff and appellant, Marjorie J. Durand, seeks
to have summary judgment granted by the court reversed and this
situation sent to a fact finder for proper disposition and findings
of fact on the matter0
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff along prior to the occurrence complained
of, had been employed in Cedar City, Iron County, State of Utah
as a supervisor of telephone operators in Cedar City, Utah, by
Mountain Bell.

She had been steadily employed in this capacity

for a number of years.

For a considerable period prior to the

time of the matter complained of, the plaintiff had lived in
trailer space #24, at 1027 North Main Street, Cedar City, Utah,
in an organized trailer court.

Neil Anderson lived in a neighbor-

ing trailer.
Prior to the 21st day of February, 1979, Neil Anderson
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and his brother were self-employed as mechanics in an automotive
repair institution in Cedar City, Iron County, State of Utah.
At times they had been involved with intoxicants and had prior
histories with the Cedar City police force. The fact that each
of them became bellicose and argumentative when interfered with
was known by police officers.

On occasion, each had threatened

to use fire arms in connection with what they termed "police
harassment;" they had on occasion prior to the 21st day of February,
1979, interfered with police officers in the due performance of
their duty while the Anderson brothers were under the influence of
alcohol,

Neil Anderson's brother!s name is Eugene Anderson.

In

the Anderson family there had been a prior history of shootings
under these conditions.

All of these items were well known to

the Cedar City police officers.
\

Upon the evening of the 21st day of February, 1979,
the defendant Grant Hinchcliff and another Cedar City police
officer by the name of Bruce Marshall stopped a vehicle on north
Main Street in Cedar City, Utah, because of the manner in which
it was being driven.

Eugene Anderson was driving the vehicle;

Neil Anderson was riding as a passenger in said vehicle.

Both

Eugene Anderson and Neil Anderson were taken into custody by the
officers.

The officers then proceeded in the investigation of

the driving while under the influence of alcohol incident.

They

took both of the Anderson brothers to the police station to apply
a breathylizer test to the driver, to-wit:

Eugene Anderson.

Neil

Anderson was taken to the police office as part of this proceeding.
While attempting to process the driving-while-under-theinfluence charges against Eugene Anderson, there was interference
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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>. ** : rig

H. L. Bradley, Arthur 0. Stewart and Grant Hinchcliff, functioning as officers of the defendant Cedar City Corporation.

At the

time of responding to said call, the defendants Bradley and Stewart
had actual knowledge of the previous conduct of Neil Anderson in
the police station that night, having obtained the same from
Officer Hinchcliff.

Both Bradley and Stewart had actual know-

ledge that he had made prior threats against police officers
whild under the influence of alcohol.

They also had actual

knowledge that he was under the influence of alcohol on this
particular evening.
The officers approached the trailer of Neil Anderson;
the defendant H. L. Bradley entered the trailer, saw Neil
Anderson sitting down with a rifle crosswise his knees, the
bolt open, attempting to insert ammunition into the same. This
was from a distance of approximately four feet.

The officers

• •-•

allowed Neil Anderson to load the gun; the officers retreated as
is shown by their affidavits, which are attached hereto as
i

Exhibits "C", "D", and M E". After considerable altercation
with Mr. Neil Anderson, with him on the porch and two of the
officers in protective positions, the shoot out commenced.

Neil

Anderson fired two or three shots, each of which were heard by
the defendants Arthur 0. Stewart and Grant Hinchcliff, none of
which could have been the shots that injured the plaintiff.
As a result of the shoot out, the plaintiff, sitting
in her own home, minding her own business, watching television,
was severely wounded.
therefrom.

The damage she has complained of resulted

In addition, Neil Anderson was killed.
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County Jail to process Eugene Anderson's arrest
and make arrangements for both men to be transported home. ?!
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behavior or other similar charge ,!
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This statement is made, although this sentence in paragraph four
states:

'This was necessary to prevent his interference with

the breathalyzer tests."

A previous statement shows that it

was necessary for an officer to control Neil Anderson while his
brother was given the breathalyzer test.
to Neil Anderson's wife being called.

Paragraph five relates

An officer placed Neil

Anderson in the passenger side of the car.
as Exhibit

M

The affidavit, marked

C " states that a call from Mrs. Anderson was

received and she requested help, and that this officer together
with one Sergeant Bradley went to the trailer.

Thereafter, the

shoot-out occurred.
Exhibits "D" and "E", which are the affidavits of
Officers Bradley and Stewart show that at the time they responded
to the call that they were aware of the prior arrest of the
Anderson brothers and the fact that Neil Anderson was drunk,
belligerent and making trouble.
Exhibit "F" shows the claim that was filed with Cedar
City.
Exhibits M A M and

M

B M are the contrary findings pertaining

to the summary judgment of the trial judge.
Exhibits "C M , M D", and

M

E M and the accompanying diagrams

show, by giving affect to the fact of them, that it was impossible
for Mrs. Durand to have been hit by Neil Anderson's bullets.

They

show without question that while Hinchcliff participated in the
earlier arrest for drunk driving and the earlier work in connection with Neil Anderson, that the other two officers were aware
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that

are entirely without fault.

There are two specific items of

evidence in this matter that the court needs to determine, towit:
1.

The actions of the defendant Hinchcliff in turning

loose a person under the influence of alcohol.
27 The actions of all three officers in the shoot out,
bearing in mind that the prior knowledge they had and the chance
they had had to disarm Neil Anderson.
The Utah State Supreme Court has held for a long period
of time that if there is any action of fact or any question of
fact, that a summary judgment should not be allowed.

This pertains

not only to damage cases such as we are talking about, but the
same applies to any other case.
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the effect
of same on cases, we have the following items that we should be
concerned about, to-wit:
Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Leah N. Abbott, 562 P.2d,
238; Pace v.Pace, 559 P.2d, 964; Madsen v. Prudential, 558 P.2d,
1337.

Burrows v. McGill, 563 P.2d, 189; Durham v. Margetts,

571 P.2d, 1332; Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291; and Rees v.
Albertson' s, Inc., 587 P.2d, 130. These particular cases are on
myriad subjects.
be granted.

They hold that summary judgment should not

The Rees v. Albertsonfs Inc., on page 133, contains

the following statement:
"To be considered in connection with
what has been said above are these principles:
that the questions relating to negligence
and proximate cause are generally for the
fact-trier, court or jury, to determine. A
party should not be deprived of the privilege
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of having such an adjudication of his claims
unless it appears that even upon the facts
claimed by him he could not establish a basis
for recovery. Moreover, when there is doubt
about the matter, it should be resolved in
favor of permitting the party to go to trial0n
Applying this to the case at bar, we come to the conclusion that
the only possibility of having a summary judgment of no cause of
action is, that even if the facts as claimed by Mrs. Durand are
true, that there can be no recovery should there be a summary
judgment.
We have found in negligence cases and guest cases that
a person should be responsible when he consciously chooses a course
of action that places others in danger.

This may be done by

inattentive driving and oftentimes this has been called conduct
evidencing a wreckless disregard for the safety of others. This
has been applied in automobile cases.

State v. Berchtold, 11

Utah 2d, 208, 357 P.2d 183; and State v. Selman, 18 Utah 2d. 199,
417 P. 2d 975.

Applying this to the case at bar, when an officer

turns loose a person under the influence of liquor, knowing that
he has a propensity for troubles, do we free the officer from the
trouble that results and do we do so by summary judgment without
evidence?

There seems to be no question that there should be a

finding of fact as to whether or not the defendants were guilty
of negligence.
POINT II
THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD A DUTY TO PROTECT THE
PLAINTIFF FROM HARM
To answer this question, one must take a look at what
is the duty of a police officer and of a city that hires police
officers to its citizens.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

There can be no question that the primary duty of police
officers is to protect the health, lives, and morals of the people
in the area that they are responsible for.

This is found in Corpus

Juris Secundum on "Police," Volume 72, page 207 in general praseology.

There are many definitions of the word "police" and of

the word "police regulation."

Volume 72, page 206-207, gives us

three classifications, to-wit:
1.

Measures which are adopted to keep order, the laws

and ordinances on cleanliness, health, and so on in effect.
2.

To procure to the authorities the means of detect-

ing the smallest attempts to commit crime, in order that the
guilty may be arrested before their plans are carried into
execution and delivered to the justice of the country.
3.

The third phase is the comprehension itself of

the laws and the measure which require the citizens to exercise
their rights.
These duties were owed to Mrs. Durand as well as to every other
citizen in the area.
A city is to set up a police force as delegated to
cities and towns by virtue of Article 11, Section 5, of the
Utah Consititution.
There can be no question that the first duty of any
officer is to prevent the violation of law.

Under these condi-

tions when they picked up Neil Anderson, as long as he was under
the influence of liquor, they should have arrested him and gone
forward with the prosecution for public intoxication under
the provisions of Title 32-7-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as amended, and under an appropriate Cedar City ordinance.

How-

ever, when officers make themselves judges and juries and find a
person that should not be confined and turn him loose, in a
known inebriated condition, the officers that turned him loose
should be held accountable for his conduct. And those that create
damage, knowing he has been turned loose, should also be held
accountable.
Certainly the duty owed to Mrs. Durand by the officers
was the same duty as owed to everyone else in the area by the
officers and by the city.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFfS CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
In all probability, items of this nature are the very
reason for the label of governmental immunities.

In our legal

system, there are always abuses that bring everything to a head.
This gives rise to two questions:

First, whether or not there

can be any recovery whatsoever on an action of this nature under
the Governmental Immunity Act; and second, whether or not the
Governmental Immunity Act has been complied with.
Pertaining to the first part of this question, Section
63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, had an amendment
in 1983.

Prior to that time, the last amendment was in 1975.

At the beginning of the section as established in 1975, set forth
in the 1978 revision of Volume 7 A, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
it states as follows:
n

Immunity from suit of all governmental
entites is waived for injury proximately
caused by a negligent act or omission of
an employee committed within the scope of
hisDigitized
employment
if the
by the Howard W.except
Hunter Law Library,
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After the 1978 revision, there are eleven exceptions,, The format
in the 1983 revision is different; there are some additional
exceptionse
similar.

The contents and the meaning of same are quite

For purposes of this discussion, we probably should

consider the 1975 revision as set forth in the 1978 volume of
7 A, Utah Code Annotated.

Very probably this is the law that was

in effect in 1979, at the time that this act took place rather
than the present law.

The only item of exception that we should

be concerned about is the first one.,

It reads, to-wit:

!!

arises out of the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused.!!
This again brings us squarely to the question of what
is an officer!s duty when he takes into custody a known drunk
that is drunk and he has been taken into custody as a drunk.

It

again brings us to Officer Hinchcliff's affidavit which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Paragraph three thereof,
which is quoated as follows:

"It was apparent that both Eugene

and Neil Anderson were intoxicated.tf

It is not a discretionary

function to prosecute a person for drunkenness or for being
intoxicated.

It is a matter of duty.

The effect of the

summary judgment is to say that the officer has discretion.

The

same is true pertaining to whether or not Officer Bradley acted
properly in backing out of the trailer instead of disarming
Neil Anderson when he had a chance to do so, These are discretionary duties of the police officer.

The finding of the summary

judgment claims otherwise.
-14-
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If we have given the officer discretion as to whether
or not he can arrest a person that is intoxicated, then we must
also give him discretion as to whether or hot he must arrest a bank
robber0

Under these conditions, neither of these functions can

be termed to come under the first exception to the waiver of
immunity for the act of an officer or by a negligent act or
ommission of an employee committed within the scope of his
employment.
The other question, of course, goes to Section 63-3013 to 63-30-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
63-30-19 has not been changed.

Section

Section 63-30-13 at the time of

the acts complained of, required a notice of claim within three
months,

The 1983 Legislature has changed that to one year.

The

plaintiff contends that the notice was given while under the
three-month time limitation and that the bond was posted.

The

defendants raised these items by motion, but they were not decided
by the court.

The court in its decision on the 7th day of

January, 1983, as stated above, specifically decided no question
except granting the summary judgment.

The Court did not give

the reason therefore on any basis pertaining to the Governmental
Immunity Act.

Certainly there is a conflict on this, and

certainly it is an item that should go to proof.
A very interesting case that may have some merit
in relation to this question and to the summary judgment
question is the case of Schmitt v. Billings, 560 P.2d 516.
The very nill of that case is in the procedural questions that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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are not applicable here.

It was remanded for further proceed-

ings, with findings that there were items of controversy to be
decided by the court, with further comments that appear to be
dicta to the effect that Section 10 of Title 63-30-10, does
not appear that the three individuals from tortious acts.

The

questions in this case appear to be decided on procedural
situations and not on merit.
Under these conditions, it is believed by the undersigned that it is as a matter of law, the Governmental Immunity
Act does not prevent a defense for any defendant, with the possible
exception that Title 63-30-20, if at the time of the trial be
applicable in such a fashion that it may limit recovery from
all defendants.

Under these circumstances, there can be no

question that the case at bar should go to trial, and
the questions concerning the conduct of the officers as to
whether or not it is a proper standard under the circumstances
should be submitted to a fact-finder and whether damages should
be assessed against the defendants.
CONCLUSION

;

The finding of the trial court in relation to summary
judgment should be reversed and the matter set for trial.
DATED this

f

day of October, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,

/c^r A

PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

'\

/£. " ••

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH

MARJORIE J. DURAND,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OVERRULING AND
DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs .
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION et al.,

Civil No. 8503

Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court on Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court having reviewed the
affidavits in support of said Motion and the affidavits in opposition thereto, and the Court having reviewed the Memorandums of
Points and Authorities, and good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion for Summary Judgment
be and the same hereby is OVERRULED and DENIED, reserving to the
Defendants the right to renew said Motion at the time of pretrial
and at the completion of discovery.
DATED this

7

day of May, 1982.

VRLAN B'
^District Jud/je
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this j g
day of May, 1982,
I mailed a copy of the above ORDER to the following: PATRICK H.
FENTON, ESQ., 13 West Hoover Avenue, Cedar City, Utah 84720;
ROBERT BRAITHWAITE, ESQ., 110 North Main, Suite H, Cedar City,
Utah 84720; and ALLAN L. LARSON, ESQ., 10 Exchange Place, 11th
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110.
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ALLAN L. LARSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: 5 21-9000
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARJORIE J. DURAND,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION,
H. L- BRADLEY, ARTHUR O.
STEWART, and GRANT HINCHCLIFF,

Civil No. 8503

r

Defendants•

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment
coming on regularly for hearing on January 7, 1983, before
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Court Judge, and
plaintiff being present in person and through her attorney,
Patrick H. Fenton, and Allan L. Larson and Robert T. Braithwaite
appearing on behalf o f the defendants, and the Court having
reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and memoranda
of authorities, and defendants having objected to the affidavits
of Patrick. H- Fenton, Charlene Rowley, and Jay Jenson, and
moving to strike same for insufficiency pursuant to Rule 56,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the matter having been fully
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argued by counsel, and submitted to the Court for decision,
and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and the
Court accordingly finding that the affidavits of Patrick H.
Fenton and Jay Jenson are legally insufficient'to raise any
material issue of fact, and striking same, and the Court
further finding that there exists no issue of material fact
relative to the occurrence which is the subject of plaintiff's
Complaint, and the Court further finding that the defendants
breached no duty to the plaintiff, and that defendants are not
liable to the plaintiff for the injuries sustained as a result
of the occurrence of February 21, 1979, and having concluded
that defendants' motions should be granted, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the affidavits of
Patrick H. Fenton and Jay Jenson are stricken, and that defendants' Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment should b e ,
and the same hereby are, granted, and plaintiff's Complaint is
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, and
Summary Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendants ••
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, defendants to
recover costs.
Dated this /><^day of ^^^^^^UU-t^U,

1983.

BY THE COURT:

M.

J. Harlan Burns
District Court Judge
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

Margo D. Colegrove, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That she is employed in the law offices of Sne»w, Christensen
& Martineau, attorneys for

defendants

^

<

that she served the attached

(Case No.

8503

herein;
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

) upon the parties listed below by placing

a tru.tr and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Patrick H. Fenton, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
154 North Main Street
Cedar City, UT 84720
Robert T. Braithwaite, Esq.
Cedar City Attorney •
P. 0. Box 249
Cedar City, UT 84720

and mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the
of

February

3rd

day

, 1983.

/AM^)
'

/^largo D. Colegrove

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

3rd

day of

February

(2lo^n^ /fe^L^^

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ALLAN L. LARSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARJORIE J. DURAND,
Plaintiff,

vs.

AFFIDAVIT

CEDAR CITY CORPORATION,
H. L.BRADLEY, ARTHUR O.
STEWART, and GRANT
HINCHCLIFF,

Civil No. 8503

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
GRANT HINCHCLIFF, being first duly sworn, upon oath,
deposes and says:
1.

On or about February 21, 1'979, I was employed as an

officer of the Cedar City Police Department, having been a
member of said department for about two years.
2

At approximate 1 y 11:20 p. in, on the evening of

February 20, 1979, Officer Bruce Marshall, also of the Cedar
City Police Department and I stopped a black Chevrolet driven
by Eugene Anderson in the company of his brother Neil Anderson,
because we suspected that the driver was operating the automobile under the influence of alcohol.
3

It. was apparent that both Eugene and Neil Anderson were

intoxicated.

Eugene was informed by Officer Marshall that he

was being placed under arrest for driving under the influence
of alcohol.

Both Andersons were taken to the Iron County J-:--l

to process Eugene Anderson's arrest and make arrangements fox
both men to be transported home.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

I personally supervised Neil Anderson during the time

that the breathalyzer tests were being performed on his brother
Eugene.

This was necessary to prevent his interference with

the breathalyzer tests.

Neil Anderson demonstrated wide emo-

tional swings during this time but was controllable at all
times and did not behave in a manner necessitating his incarceration for disorderly behavior or other similar charge.
At no time did I believe that Neil Anderson's condition
endangered the safety of others.
5.

I thereafter contacted Neil Anderson's wife Charlene,

explained the situation to her and asked for her assistance
in transporting Neil home.
custody,

Neil was released into his wife's

I personally placed Neil in the passenger side of

his wife's vehic 1 e at the ja.i 1 and. Neil indicated that he
would go home and go to bed.
6.

Shortly thereafter, while Eugene Anderson's bail was

being arranged, Mrs. Neil Anderson telephoned the Cedar City
Police Department offices and stated that Neil was causing
a disturbance at the trailer park where he lived.

Sergeant

Harold Bradley, who took the call, indicated that Neil was
threatening to kill people with his gun.
7.

Sergeant Bradley, Officer Art Stewart and I responded

to Mrs. Anderson's call.

I traveled in my own patrol car,

following Sergeant Bradley and Officer Stewart to Kelly's
Trailer Court where Neil Anderson's trailer was located.
8.

Neil Anderson's trailer was the second trailer from,

the south end, on the east side of the street.

This trailer

is depicted by a .letter "A" on the attached diagram, which
I drew on or about February 21, 19 7 9, and hereby incorporate
into this Affidavit.

Sergeant Bradley parked his patrol, car

just south of the Anderson, trailer as shown, by the """ #4" on
the diagram.

I parked facing south, just to the north of

the Anderson trailer as indicated by the "#1", and adjacent
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to a white pickup truck with the initials C.P.U. painted on
the door.
diagram.

This truck is indicated by a "#2" on the attached
The white automobile driven by Charlene Anderson

to take Neil home from the jai 1 was parked in the driveway
parallel to the Anderson trailer, and is shown 011 the diagram by a"#3 M .
9,

As I exited my car, Sergeant Bradley and Officer

Stewart proceeded toward the trailer's porch which was
located on the north side of the trailer.

Sergeant Bradley,

upon reaching the trailer door, apparently saw Neil Anderson
approaching the door with a rifle in his hand.

Sergeant

Bradley shouted a warning about the gun then ran to the
northwest corner of the trailer, taking cover in the position
shown as "Bradley" on the attached diagram.

The trailer

door opened and Neil Anderson emerged carrying a shortbarreled rifle.
10.

Officer Stewart had no time to seek cover and was

standing in the grassy area between the Anderson trailer and
the white Chevrolet in the position marked "Stwt," when
Anderson emerged from hi s trailer,

Officer Stewart did not

have his gun drawn and attempted to convince .Anderson to put
the rifle down,

Anderson refused to do so and lowered the

gun barrel so as to point it at Officer Stewart.
is depicted on the attached diagram, by "Hii ich "

My position
Sergeant

Bradley and I also admonished Anderson to discard his rifle.
Both Sergeant Bradley and 1 at, thi s time drew our own guns.
11 ,

,Anderson refused to put his ri f 1 e dowi i,, He con,tinued

to point the muzzle in, the direction of Officer Stewart.
Officer Stewart moved slowly back and forth to stay ou* c. f
the rifle's line of fire, and continued talking to Anderson.
Mrs. Anderson also emerged from the trailer three times and
talked to Anderson, attempting to convince hira to put his
gun down,

Anderson refused to listen,

He indicated that he

did not want his brother held, in jail, but refused to accept
our assurances that Eugene*s bail had been processed and
Eugene would return home soon.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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12.

Before Officer Stewart could reach cover, the rifle

discharged, while pointing in the direction of Officer
Stewart and directly in line with the trailer of Marjorie
Durand, which was due west across the street from the Anderson
trailer.

Mrs

Durand*s trailer is indicated on the attached

diagram by a "B".

I saw Officer Stewart fall to the ground

and believed him to be shot.
Anderson.

I fired three rounds at

Sergeant Bradley and Officer Stewart also returned

Anderson's fire.
13.

Anderson had apparently been struck by the return

fire and began to slump into a sitting position.

As he did

so his rifle discharged again, this time in my direction,
fired three more shots at Anderson.

][: a l s o

heard

other

I

shots

being fired and saw that Sergeant Bradley was also returning
Anderson's fire.
14

Anderson's wife then emerged from the trailer and

took the rifle from her husband.

She asked for our help.

Sergeant Bradley and Officer Stewart approached Anderson first.
It was apparent that Anderson had been severely wounded and
was either dying or dead,
15.

The accompanying diagram accurately depicts the

positions of all parties at the time the first shot was fired.
Sergeant Bradley, Officer Stewart and I were all facing east
to southeast during the exchange of gunfire.

Sergeant Bradley,

having observed the direction of Anderson's first shot, was
concerned about the occupants of the trailer immediately
across the street to the west of the Anderson trailer.
16.

Sergeant Bradley proceeded to check said trailer and

found that a woman, later identified as Marjorie Durand, had
been shot ii i, the lower leg,

An ambulance was called for and

first aid was administered until the ambulance arrived.
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17.

I was in a position to observe all of the parties

engaged in the exchange of gunfire.

At no time did Sergeant

Bradley, Officer Stewart or 1 fire our weapons in the
direction of Mrs. Durand's trailer, which was behind us as
we returned Anderson's fire.

Only Anderson's shots could

have resulted in Mrs. Durand's injury.
Dated this 47W

day of v J A j J ^ t e c /

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '/ ^ •

198 2,

day of QtiA'MA

1982.
NOTARY PUBLIC
/
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission
-ommissip. Expires:

JL
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss,
)

'A H-it .,. COLEGROVE , be; I ng du 1 y s wori i, s ay s ;
T h • J • '. ie is employed in the offices of Sno w, CI i r i s t e i I s e n
£ Mai tine-i'-. , Attorneys for

defendants

herein;
that she served the attached

AFFIDAVIT of Grant Hinchcliff
(Case Number

upon

8503

plaintiff

)
by

placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and
addressing " -

to:

Patrick H. Fenton, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
13 West Hoover Avenue
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Robert T. Braithwaite, Esq.
Cedar City Attorney
P. 0. Box 249
Cedar City, Utah 84720

a i J d in a 1 3 11 i g 11 i e s a m e , f > < :»s t a g e p r e - j a i d, o n t h e
January

, 19 82,

18th

day o f

'

^>^e^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

18th

day of

January

19 82.
Notary Public
LC
Residing in the State of Utah
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ALLAN L. LARSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARJORIE J. DURAND,

]

Plaintiff,
.

vs.

AFFIDAVIT
Civil No. 850

CEDAR CITY CORPORATION,
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR
O. STEWART and GRANT
HINCHCLIFF,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH )
) ss.
IRON COUNTY
)

HAROLD L. BRADLEY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and says:

1.

On or about February 21, 1979, I was employed as a

sergeant in the Cedar City Police Department,. Iron County, Utah
having been a member of said department for approximately 11
years.
2.

Shortly after midnight, on February 21, 1979, I received

a phone call at the offices of the Cedar City Police Department
from Mrs. Neil Anderson.

Mrs. Anderson indicated that her

husband was causing a disturbance at the trailer park where he
resided, in that he was threatening to get his gun and start
killing people.

3.

In response to Mrs. Anderson's call I took officer Art

Stewart of the Cedar City Police Department with me in my patrol
car and proceeded to the Anderson trailer which was located at
Kelly's Trailer Park,

Officer Grant Hinchcliff, also of the

Cedar City Police Department followed in his own patrol car.
I parked my car slightly sough of the west end of the Anderson
trailer, which Digitized
was located
on the east side of the street. On
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the diagram attached hereto and hereby incorporated into this
Affidavit, the Anderson trailer is indicated by a "AM and
my car is indicated by a "#4 M .

Officer Hinchcliff parked his

car slightly north of the Anderson trailer, as shown by a M #l"
on the attached diagram.
4.

Officer Hinchcliff remained by his patrol car in the

position designated by "Hinch" on the diagram, while Officer
Stewart and I approached the steps located on the north side
of the Anderson trailer.

Through the windows on the west end

of the trailer, I saw an individual appearing to be Neil
Anderson, who was personally known to me.
5.

Upon reaching the front door of the trailer, I could

see Neil Anderson through the window of the door, approaching
the door with a rifle in his hands.

I shouted a warning to

Officers Stewart and Hinchcliff about the rifle and immediately
stepped back to the northwest corner of the trailer to find
some protection.

My position at that time is shown on the

attached diagram as "Bradley".
6.

Anderson had the apparently loaded rifle in his posses-

ion from the moment that I recognized him in the trailer.

At

no time did I or officer Stewart have an opportunity to disarm
Anderson before he emerged from the trailer with the weapon.
7.

Neil Anderson stepped onto the trailer's porch with

the rifle in his hands.

Officer Hinchcliff and I had at this

time drawn our guns, Officer Stewart had been unable to find
cover before Anderson emerged from his trailer and was standing
without a drawn weapon on the grass between the trailer and
a white Chevrolet designated as "#3" on the attached diagram.
Officer Stewart's approximate location at this time is shown
by the letters "Stwt" on the attached diagram.
8.

Officer Stewart, Officer Hinchcliff and I all repeatedly

asked Anderson to put down his gun.

Anderson stated that he

wanted his brother Eugene released from jail.

Eugene Anderson

had been arrested earlier in the evening for driving under
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influence of alcohol.

Neil Anderson was told that his

brother's bail had been arranged and that he would be home
shortly.

Anderson did not respond to this information and

continued to point his rifle in the direction of Officer
Stewart and Anderson threatened to kill Stewart even if we
were successful in shooting Anderson.
9.

I observed Anderson release what appeared to be a

safety mechanism on his rifle and Anderson continued to follow
Officer Stewart's movements with the rifle.

During this

conversation, Stewart had slowly yet constantly moved and
tried to avoid the muzzle of Anderson's rifle.
10.

At about the time Officer Stewart reached the northwest

corner of the grassy area between the trailer and the white
Chevrolet, Anderson's gun discharged while pointing west
toward Officer Stewart.

I saw Officer Stewart fall to the

ground and believed that Stewart had been shot.

I fired five

shots at Anderson in rapid succession.

11.

As Anderson, who had apparently been shot, slid into

a sitting position against the trailer, he fired another shot
in the direction of Officers Hinchcliff and Stewart, apparently
striking the white Chevrolet,"#3" on the attached diagram.

I

fired another shot at Anderson and further return fire also
came from Officer Hinchcliff.

Mrs. Anderson then emerged from

the trailer and took the rifle from Mr. Anderson's hands and
asked for our assistance.
12.

I then checked Anderson's condition and it appeared

that he was mortally wounded.

I then recalled that the first

shot fired by Anderson had been aimed directly west from the
Anderson porch and realized that the bullet must have entered
the trailer that was on the west side of the street across from
the Anderson trailer.

This trailer is indicated by a H B M on

the attached diagram.
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13.

I went to the trailer on the west side of the street

to check on the safety of its occupants.

Through the window

of the trailer I could see a woman lying on the floor,
talking on the telephone, and bleeding from a wound in her
right lower leg.

Her position is shown by "M. Dur." on

the attached diagram.

At the urging of myself and Officer

Stewart, the woman managed to crawl to the door and open it.
Officer Stewart and I continued to administer first aid to
the woman until an ambulance arrived.

The woman was subse-

quently identified as Mrs. Marjorie Durand.
14.

I was in a position to observe the actions of all

the parties involved in the exchange of gunfire.

None of the

responding officers, including myself, at any time discharged
our guns in the direction of Mrs. Durand1s trailer, which
was behind our backs as we returned Anderson's fire.

I care-

fully observed the direction of Anderson's first shot and
this led to my discovery of Mrs. Durand in her injured condition.

I believe and therefore state that only Anderson's

original shot could have been responsible for the wounding of
Mrs. Durand.
Dated thi:

con C o u n t y ,

Utah

My7Commi
m issssiioonn,. E x p i r e s :

/I msr

-4-
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

MARGO b. COLEGROVE, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, Attorneys for

defendants

herein;
that she served the attached

AFFIDAVIT of Harold L. Bradley
(Case Number

upon

8503

)

plaintiff

by

placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and
addressing it to:

Patrick H. Fenton, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
13 West Hoover Avenue
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Robert T. Braithwaite, Esq.
Cedar City Attorney
P. 0. Box 249
Cedar City, Utah 84720

and mailing the same, postage pre-paid, on the
January

* 1982,

18th

day of

'

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th

day of

January

t

19 82.

v_ xl LUsLu YU^y
Notary Public /
Residing in the State of Utah
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A L L A N L. LARSON
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, UT
84110
Telephone: 521-9000
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARJORIE J.

DURAND,
Plaintiff,

vs.

AFFIDAVIT

CEDAR CITY CORPORATION,
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR
O. STEWART and GRANT
HINCHCLIFF,

Civil No. 8503

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH)
) ss.
IRON COUNTY
)
ARTHUR O. STEWART, being first duly sworn upon oath
deposes and says:

1.

On or about February 21, 1979, I was employed as an

officer of the Cedar City Police Department, Iron County, Utah
having been a member of said department for approximately
four years.
2.

At approximately midnight on the evening of February

20, 1979, I was with Sergeant Harold Bradley of the Cedar
City Police Department at the department's offices when
Sergeant Bradley received a call from Mrs. Neil Anderson
indicating that her husband was causing a disturbance at the
trailer park where they lived.
3.

In response to said call I accompanied Sergeant

Bradley in the latter's car to Kelly's Trailer Park, with
Officer Grant Hinchcliff following in his patrol car.

The

Anderson trailer was located on the east side of the street,
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in the position designated by the letter "A" on the attached
diagram, which I hereby incorporate into this Affidavit.
Sergeant Bradley and I parked slightly south of the west end
of the Anderson trailer in the position shown by the "#4" on
the diagram.

Officer Hinchcliff parked further north, as

shown by the "#1" on the attached diagram.
4.

Sergeant Bradley and I approached the trailer while

Officer Hinchcliff remained near his car in the position
designated "HINCH" on the diagram.

Through the trailer's

windows I observed a man who appeared to be Neil Anderson
standing in the kitchen area of the trailer, working with his
hands on an unidentifiable object that was lying on a counter
top.
5.

Sergeant Bradley and I started up the trailer's stairs,

which were located on the north side of the trailer.

Neil

Anderson approached the trailer door with a rifle in his hands.
Sergeant Bradley yelled "He's got a gun" following which
Bradley retreated and took cover behind the northwest corner
of the trailer in the location marked "Bradley" on the diagram.
6.

At no time did I or the other police officers respond-

ing to Mrs. Anderson's call have an opportunity to take the
rifle from Neil Anderson's possession before he emerged from
the trailer brandishing it in a menacing fashion.
7.

I started to retreat towards the street but Neil

Anderson had stepped onto the porch, gun in hand, while I was
still on the grass between the trailer and a white Chevrolet
parked parallel to the trailer.

On the attached diagram,

I was approximately at the position indicated by the letters
"Stwt" and the white Chevrolet is designated as "#3".
8.

Sergeant Bradley, Officer Hinchcliff and I all attempted

at this time to persuade Anderson to put his gun down.

Mrs.

Anderson also repeatedly emerged from the trailer and
attempted to persuade her husband to put down his rifle.

I
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V_/

did not have my gun drawn at this time, although Officer
Hinchcliff and Sergeant Bradley did.

Anderson repeatedly

stated that he wanted his brother Eugene released from jail.
Eugene Anderson had been arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol earlier in the evening while in the
company of Neil.

Yet Neil did not respond to our assurances

that Eugene's bail was being processed and that his brother
would return home soon.
9.

During the conversation with Neil Anderson, I moved

slowly north and south across the lawn backing towards the
street, trying to avoid the muzzle of the gun that Anderson
continued to point in my direction.

At one point Anderson

indicated that even if the other officers were successful in
shooting him, he intended to kill me with the rifle which he
described as a .350 Magnum.
10.

As I neared the corner of the lawn and sidewalk by

the right rear corner of the white Chevrolet parked in the

i

driveway, Anderson turned to look at Sergeant Bradley as
Bradley said something to him.

As I took a step to the left,

Anderson's gun discharged and the bullet passed me to the
right, heading directly west towards the trailer of Marjorie
Durand, which is marked by a H B H on the attached diagram.
11.

When Anderson's gun discharged I dove behind the

white Chevrolet, moved to a more protected position on the
north side of the car, stood, and fired four rounds at Anderson.
Sergeant Bradley and Officer Hinchcliff were also returning
Anderson's fire, from their positions indicated as "Bradley"
and "Hindi" on the diagram.
12.

As Anderson began to slump into a sitting position,

his rifle discharged again, the bullet striking the white
automobile behind which I was ^tan<iiftg.

Sergeant Bradley and

Officer Hinchcliff again returned fire, from their same positions.
13.

Mrs. Anderson then emerged from the trailer and took

the rifle from Anderson's hands.

I approached Anderson and

checked and found that he had no pulse.

Sergeant Bradley

used his radio to contact an ambulance.
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Shortly thereafter I saw Sergeant Bradley pounding

on the door of the trailer directly west across the street
from the Anderson trailer.

This was the direction which

Andersons initial shot had traveled.

I heard Sergeant

Bradley ask the trailer's occupant to open the door if that
were possible.

The trailer's occupant managed to open the

door and I followed Sergeant Bradley into the trailer and
observed that a woman later identified as Marjorie Durand
had been struck in the right lower leg by a bullet.

I stayed

with Mrs. Durand and administered first aid until an ambulance
arrived.
15.

I was in a position to observe the direction of the

shots fired by Sergeant Bradley, myself and Neil Anderson.
I was narrowly missed by Anderson's original shot, which was
aimed directly at the Durand trailer across the street.

As

the Durand trailer was behind the backs of all three responding police officers, I believe and therefore state that it
is not possible that Mrs. Durand was struck by a police
bullet and only Anderson's original shot could have resulted
in the injury to Mrs. Durand.
Dated this

/ c(

day of

/)xLC-

* 1981.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on_this / 7 6 4 day of

lUQCQMbM

, 1981.

_ f<U\

N O ^ R Y PUBLIC
Residing in Iron County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

/2--I-T3
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

MARGO D. COLEGROVE, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, Attorneys for

defendants

herein;
that she served the attached

A F F T D A V T T of Arthur Q. Rt-pwart-.
(Case Number

upon

8503

)

plaintiff

by

placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and
addressing it to:

Patrick H. Fenton, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
13 West Hoover Avenue
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Robert T. Braithwaite, Esq.
Cedar City Attorney
P. 0. Box 249
Cedar City, Utah 84720

and mailing the same, postage pre-paid, on the
January

, 1982.

18th

day of

'

"~7fcxL*r

go D. Coleg^Dve

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th

day of

v*^

January

19 82.

ULUJL&X

fuf\kv

Notary
ry Publi£
Residing in the
State of Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

f

frLU- <<F{K
NOTICE OF CLAIM
TO CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, Cedar City, Utah:
You are hereby advised that I was injured by flying bullets
on or about the 21st day of February of 1979 in my home at 1027 North
Main Street, Trailer Space Number 24, arising out of a bullet exchange
between Cedar City Police and a gentleman by the name of Anderson,
who lived adjacent in this heavily populated area of Cedar City,
Utah.
You are hereby advised that I have a tremendous hospital
bill and various other things arising out of being hit in both legs,
that I have lost two toes and have cut nerves, cut ligaments, torn
tendons, muscle damage and various other things, and I am advised
that I will need nerve surgery and therapy for nerves before I am
through.
In addition to the physical injury and the pain and suffering,
my trailer has been damaged and the interior of the trailer is no
longer fit for human habitation.
In addition you are advised I am being damaged by loss of
earning capacity and loss of income.
While I have no idea what the final bill is going to be,
it now appears that it will not be under $100,000.00, and may go
much higher, even as much as one-half million dollars, depending
of course upon the time I am out of work, the surgery, the hospitalization and items of this nature.
I was hospitalized in Cedar City, Utah by orders of
Cedar City policemen and have a tremendous hospital bill as a result
thereof.

In addition to this it is my considered opinion that Cedar

City officers were negligent in this matter from the standpoint of
allowing a person under the influence of alcohol and worked up to
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go home after arresting his brother for driving under the influence
of alcohol and that they are again negligent in answering the call
in the manner in which the shootout was provoked and brought about
and the further item that having actual knowledge that a person
under the influence of liquor was making threats with a gun toward
them, Cedar City's police force caused a shootout in a heavily populated area instead of taking it out into some area that was not
heavily populated.
(/

DATED this

hM

day of

e

^

, 1979.

'maM.s-'ft £U/w-A
MMJQgJlE M DURAND
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Iron

)

On the

ss.

J/

day of

HA

A

£ //

, 1979, per-

sonally appeared before me MARJORIE J. DURAND, the signer of the
foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed
the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC
/
Residing at { C ^ . ^

c 2e-

-?.S.

My Commission Expires:

7 r?ihi

i ?s ^

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to Allan L. Larson, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU, Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, 10 Exchange
Place, Eleventh Floor, P. 0. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, UT 84110,
this 11th day of October, 1983.

f-
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